Sunday, September 13, 2009

The Naga Peace Talks: Some Glimmer of Hope

-->
Since independence, a series of problems ranging from uneven development, electoral politics, influence of Christianity, minority syndrome, and influx of illegal migrants have shaped the politicization of ethnic identities and the separatist movements in the Northeast.

A
s India marches ahead with its nation building project, the peace talks between the central government and leaders of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN IM) provides some hope. The present talks assume significance as there is a general consensus cutting across internal tribal divisions in favour of talks with the Indian government. The BJP-led government had initiated talks with the NSCN (IM) in September 1998, which has continued in Thailand and various European capitals. The arrival of Isaac Chishi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah, the leaders of NSCN (IM), in New Delhi is a step forward in this direction, following the ceasefire in 1997, and the recent lifting of the ban on the organisation. The meeting that took place on 8 January 2003 has been hailed as a milestone and the first of its kind in 36 years.

T
he politicization of Naga ethnicity can be traced to the formation of a Naga club in 1918 comprising members of the new Naga middle class. The first document which highlights their concerns and fears is their memorandum submitted to the Simon Commission in 1929. Their apprehension about losing their autonomy was evident by the statement by one of its members, "you the British are the only people who have ever conquered us and when you go we should be left as we were." The Nagas had suffered from a minority syndrome in undivided Assam . Soon after independence some sections of the Nagas under Zapu Phizo put forward the demand for a separate homeland for Nagas outside the Indian Union. They went ahead with the formation of the Government of Nagaland in exile after having denounced the Indian constitution. However, intra tribal differences emerged between the secessionists and others prepared to settle for autonomy within the Indian union. The grant of statehood to Nagaland in 1963 left the separatists marginalized. The later Shillong accord in 1975 failed to bring peace to Nagaland, mainly because it was not endorsed by all sections of the rebels. The present leadership of the NSCN (IM) had also opposed the accord. Since early 1992 this problem has been compounded by Naga-Kuki clashes.

Over the years the Naga insurgency has undergone a qualitative change from conventional guerilla warfare and mass mobilization to extortion and indiscriminate violence giving a fillip to the popular demand for peace and reconciliation after four decades of bloodshed. The main demands of the NSCN are:
· Creation of a single administrative unit for the Naga dominated areas of the Northeast.
· Greater autonomy in appreciation of their cultural distinctiveness.
However these demands are a challenge to regional and national unity. The concept of Nagalim seeks the integration of all the Naga inhabited regions into a single administered unit. The passage of a resolution in the Nagaland assembly to this effect has stoked Meitei subnationalism in Manipur, aggravated by their existing grievances of not being granted statehood by the Centre till 1972 and preferential treatment being accorded to the Nagas. The anti-ceasefire movements in Manipur during mid-2001 resulted in the death of 18 Meitei protesters, forcing the Central Government not to extend the ceasefire areas having a Naga population outside Nagaland. Evading any direct reference to Naga areas outside Nagaland, Isaac Swu said, "there is no greater or smaller Nagaland, there is just Nagaland." If this were implemented, the state of Manipur would shrink to one tenth its present area.
T
here are several difficulties therefore confronting the peace talks. First, the greater Nagalim demand cannot be conceded by the Union Government as it could find echoes in other parts of the country where some states have been agitating for pockets of land having different linguistic populations belonging to their neighbouring states and vice-versa.

S
econdly, whilst travel by NSCN (IM) leaders on Indian passports might be construed as indicating their desire to settle within the framework of the Indian constitution, other factions need to accept this modality.

Lastly the Indian state needs to erode its traditional patron-client relationship to deal with the realities of ethnopolitics to resolve such crises. The usual practice has been to co-opt the leadership of a community, as was the case of the Mizo National Front leader, Laldenga, to end the Mizo crisis, or encourage an alternative leadership if this fails. In extreme cases the conflict was sought to be contained by the use of force whilst exploring other options.

Published on 27 January 2003, Institute of peace and Conflict Studies.
URL:

http://www.ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=960

No comments:

Post a Comment

Challenges of Religious Terrorism

BOOK REVIEW: Published in The Book Review, Volume XL, Number 3, March 2016, pp. 71-72, ISSN: 0970-4175 Deconstructing Terrorist Vio...